Politics

Senator, That's Not The Issue

WISPs who are eager to use the 700 MHz band will be disappointed. McCain's spectrum law is politics as usual in Washington, D.C. It ensures that as big money changes hands and noble sentiments about first responders are aired, special interests get special deals and small business is shut out of the spectrum.

by Alex Goldman ISP-Planet Managing Editor [September 23, 2005]

Senator John McCain is certain that the key problem first responders faced in 9-11 was spectrum availability, and he has the solution:

Providing first responders access to this spectrum is one of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and remains a top priority for Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton.

The spectrum that McCain wants to hand to first responders is in the 700 MHz band. The argument seems to be that the various bands currently available to first responders, such as 4.9 GHz and a 400 MHz band, are inadequate (for full spectrum allocation, see the chart, noting that first responders tend to use frequencies listed in the chart as allocated for MOBILE).

In fact, on 9-11, spectrum was not the problem. It was all about training and preparedness. Specifically, a repeater system was in place but the New York Fire Department did not know how to activate it. We heard unsubstantiated rumors at an ISPCON last year that training budgets were cut, and this was the result, but we cannot be certain of that. What we do know is in the 9-11 commission report, Chapter 9:

One button on the repeater system activation console in the North Tower was pressed at 8:54, though it is unclear by whom. As a result of this activation, communication became possible between FDNY portable radios on the repeater channel. In addition, the repeater's master handset at the fire safety desk could hear communications made by FDNY portable radios on the repeater channel. The activation of transmission on the master handset required, however, that a second button be pressed. That second button was never activated on the morning of September 11.

At 9:05, FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex's repeater system. Because the second button had not been activated, the chief on the master handset could not transmit. He was also apparently unable to hear another chief who was attempting to communicate with him from a portable radio, either because of a technical problem or because the volume was turned down on the console (the normal setting when the system was not in use).

The report notes that although the fire department was unable to communicate, the police department's radio system worked perfectly. It notes without passing censure that the police and fire departments failed to set up headquarters in the same room, let alone the same building, even though the emergency response plan called for the fire chief and police chief to be together so that they could work together. The report also notes that the fire department doesn't have helicopters, that the police do, and that it was police helicopters that predicted the collapse of the towers. Police got the message, the fire department did not. The NYFD has a plan for better equipment, but it will take years, and they may not buy the same equipment that the NYPD uses.

In a detailed examination of the problems, firefighter Steve Modica told the Associated Press, "It's a disgrace. The police are talking to each other. It's a no-brainer: Get us what they're using. We send people to the moon, and you mean to tell me a firefighter can't talk to a guy two floors above him?"

The 9-11 Commission's recommendations to government are contained in Chapter 12. Although there is one vague sentence concerning spectrum allocation, most of the recommendations address the real issue: that first responders from different agencies had equipment that was not interoperable.

It's about television, not public safety
The key recommendations of the 9-11 report are about interoperability, not spectrum. So what's really going on? We call Mark Schubin, technical editor for online television industry publications Videography and Digital TV. Schubin, a veteran guru and consultant, has been covering digital television for about as long as it's been around. He is both knowledgeable and unorthodox. He is unafraid of controversy, which is exactly why we want to speak to him.

He suggests we do the research outlined above, showing that the key 9-11 recommendations had very little to do with spectrum. "McCain's harping on a tiny thing in the 9-11 report. There are large paragraphs containing recommendations. They talk about interoperability, about improving communications systems, and then there's one line that says 'they need more spectrum'. If you read the report, you'll see the Port Authority had 16 times more spectrum than they used."

Chapter 9 of the 9-11 report notes, again, that the issue was training and preparedness, not spectrum:

Most Port Authority police commands used ultra-high-frequency radios. Although all the radios were capable of using more than one channel, most PAPD officers used one local channel. The local channels were low-wattage and worked only in the immediate vicinity of that command. The PAPD also had an agencywide channel, but not all commands could access it.

As of September 11, the Port Authority lacked any standard operating procedures to govern how officers from multiple commands would respond to and then be staged and utilized at a major incident at the WTC. In particular, there were no standard operating procedures covering how different commands should communicate via radio during such an incident.

Valuable 700 MHz spectrum
In fact, Schubin says, the issue is about forcing the broadcast industry to relinquish control of valuable spectrum. In part of the 1996 Telecom Act, he explains, television stations were temporarily allocated channels across the spectrum to ease the transition to digital broadcast.

After the transition, some spectrum in the 700 MHz range will be freed for other uses. The total spectrum to be made available is eighteen channels of 6 MHz each for a total of 108 MHz. Of that, four channels, 24 MHz, would go to emergency responders.

So who benefits? Lucent's in favor of the law. Motorola likes it too. Qualcomm has already bought channel 55 in some areas and is making complex deals that involve helping TV stations vacate analog broadcast spectrum, turning it over to the company. Qualcomm's most recent deal will enable mobile video in the New York area.

Perhaps the most ludicrous special deal is Nextel's, but several major companies each have a special interest, as described in US Spectrum Wars.

Recent Congressional testimony by Michael Calabrese of the New America Foundation shows [.pdf] that the U.S. government expects to auction off the portion of spectrum that the first responders won't use for tens of billions of dollars. That means big business gets the spectrum and WISPs get shut out. That means business as usual in Washington, D.C.

Schubin says that technological transitions take time, and that people shouldn't assume that they'll happen faster in the Internet era. The color television standard was finalized in 1953, but it wasn't until 1978 that there were more households in the U.S. with color television as opposed to black and white. The transition from dial to touch tone took time.

If you want change to happen quickly, you have to send an installer to every home. During the transition from manufactured gas to natural gas in the U.S., Schubin says, the gas company sent installers around to change the burners. When Southern Ontario in Canada, which includes the city of the Toronto, changed from 25 Hz electric power to 60 Hz electric power, the power company sent installers to change the motors in clocks, refrigerators, and other appliances.

Page 4 of the Calabrese testimony suggests that the government should pay for digital receivers for a certain number of homes. Schubin, however, points out that many homes have more than one television. Assume, however, that Congress authorized the U.S. Government to purchase 100 million digital receivers for $50 each. Would that be a good idea? Who would install them? FEMA? Lucent?

Calabrese says that if you're auctioning off $20 billion in spectrum, buying $5 billion in TV equipment is easy, but however you slice it, $5 billion is a lot of money for the equipment manufacturers.

It is realistic to expect that the broadcast TV industry will vacate the spectrum, Schubin says. "The TV lobby caved in earlier this year. They're pursuing other areas, like ensuring carriage on cable and satellite."

Calabrese's testimony says that about 15 percent of U.S. households still rely on broadcast television. Schubin assumes they'll be left in the dark. He says that could be a real problem in the event of disaster. "Since 9-11, more people are relying on TV news than before," he says.

He says McCain's law will achieve the opposite of what it's purporting to do. "McCain is saying TV stations need to go off the air to save lives. He's exactly 100 percent wrong. Lives will be endangered by turning off TV stations."

But the special interests will get the spectrum.

—End

Feedback
Sam Churchill writes on dailywireless.org:

The real scandal might be how 700 Mhz owners lobbied the FCC to eliminate unlicensed 700 Mhz for public use of their airwaves.

Why don't you look into that, Alex? Michael Calabrese, Director, Wireless Future Program, New American Foundation did (.pdf).

Thanks Sam. You've got useful information there and good work covering the TV spectrum issue in detail. Calabrese did great work too, and WISPs are telling me they are able to work with the New American Foundation.